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In the paper, the consequences of using double majority voting in the European Council of
Ministers are analysed. An equivalent single majority distribution of seats is proposed and evaluated.
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1. Principle of proportionality
At the beginning of every democratic representative system lies down the propor-
tionality.
Let a given assembly consist of m seats, which have to be distributed among N
subgroups  N s s s ..., , , 2 1 ,  m s N i s
i
i i = = ≥ ∑
=
N
1
    , ..., 2, , 1     , 1 . In the case of European
Union institutions a subgroup usually denotes a country.
Democratic apportionment of seats has to be proportionally correlated with popu-
lation of a country. Let pi denotes cardinality of the i-th subgroup,  N i ..., , 2 , 1 =  and
∑
=
=
N
i
i p p
1
. Hence  m p/ = λ  is a coefficient of proportionality, which enables us to
determine the number of seats for every subgroup in m-seats assembly.
Such an apportionment must produce integer values so a kind of rounding has to
be used:  ) ( i s δ ,  ] / [ λ i i p s = . It gives non-deterministic result: si or si + 1 seats. In
Balinski and Young, 1975, we have:
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The function δ  is a monotonic increasing function of non-negative integers s and
only for  ) ( / s p δ λ =  gives a unique solution.
Proportional distribution of seats is the core idea of democracy but is not in use, at
least in European Union! For example, Widgren (1994) described the number of seats
in the EU Council of Ministers as a function of population:
p v
465 . 2 log 0063 . 0 log =
where p denotes population and v denotes number of seats.
Paterson (1997) modifies this approximation by
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In both cases exponential function of approximation contradicts proportionality.
The entering of new members changes this situation very much (entering countries
have very different population: from Poland with nearly 39 millions of citizens to 0.36
million of Malta). Standard regression attempt produces the following approximation
(square root-p model):
i i p v 1317 . 1 9498 . 0 + =
with  5092 . 97
2 = R , while the next two models: linear and multiplicative ones gave
1542 . 91
2 = R  and  4794 . 92
2 = R , respectively. The result is not very far from linear,
i.e., it is close to proportional
1.
                                                     
1 In most cases, the Council takes decisions by a “qualified majority”. The authors of the Treaty of
Rome determined the qualified majority using a system of weighted votes reflecting the population of the
Member States, with a correction in favour of States with smaller populations. This system has been
adapted to take account of successive enlargements, without changing the relative weight of the Member
States as laid down at the outset. Under the present arrangement (EU-15), the number of votes attributed
to Member States varies from 10 (for those with the largest populations) to 2, making a grand total of 87
votes. Under Article 205 EC, acts are adopted by qualified majority if there are at least 62 votes in favour
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Table 1
Proportional apportionment of seats for EU-25 European Council
(before the Treaty of Nice)
Country Votes
(V)
Population
(P) (3)/lambda
Seats
I round
Seats
II round
Residuals Seats
III round
1 2345678
Belgium 5 10.06 2.757217 2 2 0.757217 2
Denmark 3 5.19 1.4224609 1 2 –0.5775391 2
Germany 10 80.77 22.137218 22 22 0.1372183 21
Greece 5 10.38 2.8449217 2 2 0.8449217 2
Spain 8 39.13 10.724642 10 10 0.7246422 9
France 10 57.65 15.800553 15 15 0.8005526 14
Ireland 3 3.57 0.9784557 0 2 –1.0215443 2
Italy 10 57.84 15.852627 15 15 0.8526273 15
Luxemburg 2 0.39 0.1068901 0 2 –1.8931099 2
Holland 5 15.28 4.1879002 4 4 0.1879002 3
Austria 4 7.94 2.1761733 2 2 0.1761733 2
Portugal 5 9.85 2.6996608 2 2 0.6996608 2
Finland 3 5.07 1.3895716 1 2 –0.6104284 2
Sweden 4 8.71 2.3872127 2 2 0.3872127 2
United Kingdom 10 58.04 15.907443 15 15 0.9074428 15
Malta 2 0.38 0.1041493 0 2 –1.8958507 2
Cyprus 2 0.71 0.1945948 0 2 –1.8054052 2
Estonia 2 1.48 0.4056343 0 2 –1.5943657 2
Slovenia 2 1.99 0.5454137 0 2 –1.4545863 2
Latvia 3 2.42 0.6632669 0 2 –1.3367331 2
Lithuania 3 3.69 1.011345 1 2 –0.988655 2
Slovakia 3 5.38 1.4745355 1 2 –0.5254645 2
Hungary 5 10.18 2.7901063 2 2 0.7901063 2
Czech Republic 5 10.32 2.8284771 2 2 0.8284771 2
Poland 8 38.71 10.60953 10 10 0.6095298 9
Total: 122 445.13 122 109 127 –5 122
As is seen from table 1 the proportional apportionment (truncated to 2) of seats for
6486 . 3 = λ  (according to the least remainders method) is also approximation. Linear
model for  650508 . 0 = a  and  236575 . 0 = b  gives  973703 . 0
2 = R , which is compara-
ble with linear model of square p (both models have high determination) and also
gives some privileges for small countries.J. W. MERCIK 56
Table 2
Proportional apportionment of seats for EU-25 European Council
(after the Treaty of Nice)
Country Votes (V)
Nice Treaty
Population
(P)
(3)/lambda
lamb = 1.3866
Seats
I round
Seats
II round
(>=3)
Residuals Seats
III round
1 23 4 5678
Belgium 12 10.06 7.2546447 7 7 0.2546447 6
Denmark 7 5.19 3.7427044 3 3 0.7427044 3
Germany 29 80.77 58.246288 58 58 0.2462876 57
Greece 12 10.38 7.4854088 7 7 0.4854088 7
Spain 27 39.13 28.218116 28 28 0.2181161 27
France 29 57.65 41.573585 41 41 0.5735852 41
Ireland 7 3.57 2.5744614 2 3 –0.4255386 3
Italy 29 57.84 41.710601 41 41 0.7106014 41
Luxemburg 4 0.39 0.2812437 0 3 –2.7187563 3
Holland 13 15.28 11.018983 11 11 0.0189832 10
Austria 10 7.94 5.7258329 5 5 0.7258329 5
Portugal 12 9.85 7.1032058 7 7 0.1032058 6
Finland 7 5.07 3.6561679 3 3 0.6561679 3
Sweden 10 8.71 6.2811089 6 6 0.2811089 6
United Kingdom 29 58.04 41.854829 41 41 0.8548289 41
Malta 3 0.38 0.2740323 0 3 –2.7259677 3
Cyprus 4 0.71 0.5120077 0 3 –2.4879923 3
Estonia 4 1.48 1.0672837 1 3 –1.9327163 3
Slovenia 4 1.99 1.4350639 1 3 –1.5649361 3
Latvia 4 2.42 1.7451531 1 3 –1.2548469 3
Lithuania 7 3.69 2.6609979 2 3 –0.3390021 3
Slovakia 7 5.38 3.8797205 3 3 0.8797205 3
Hungary 12 10.18 7.3411812 7 7 0.3411812 7
Czech Republic 12 10.32 7.4421405 7 7 0.4421405 7
Poland 27 38.71 27.915238 27 27 0.9152382 27
Total: 321 445.13 321 309 326 –5 321
The Nice Treaty solves the number of seats in European Council for each of 25
countries, as presented in table 2. A qualified majority will be secured, where
2:
•  the number of votes in favour of a decision is close to the present threshold
(71.26% of votes) in a Union of fifteen Member States. At first, the threshold will
evolve in step with the accessions, up to a maximum of 73.4% of votes. Afterwards,
once the twelve applicant countries with which the Union has already started accession
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negotiations have joined, the qualified majority threshold will be set at 255 votes out of
345; a majority of Member States votes in favour of a decision,
• in addition, a Member State may ask for verification that the qualified majority
comprises at least 62% of the total population of the EU. Should this not be the case,
the decision will not be adopted.
The proportional method of apportionment truncated to 3 gives results presented
in table 2. As we see, actual number of seats (after the Nice Treaty) allocated to given
countries differs from the proportional one very much, so the actual distribution is not
proportional.
Having a template (proportional apportionment of seats) one can evaluate how far
from ideal distribution the actual one is. For certain distribution of seats we can cal-
culate the mean distance from the template as:
∑
=
− =
n
i
i i v v
n
d
1
2 ideal) (
1
where:
–  i v  denotes the actual number of seats for a given country i,
– 
ideal
i v  denotes the ideal (proportional) number of seats for a given country i.
For distribution of seats from the Treaty of Nice we obtain the mean distance from
the template as equal to 7.7408. For EU-25 with distribution of seats according to the
pre-Nice Treaty conditions this distance is 3.1749. As we see, the actual distance is
almost twice that noted before, so the Treaty did not improve the proportionality.
The above inconsistency of seats distribution was probably the reason for introduc-
ing the second criterion into the process of decision-making: countries “for” must repre-
sent at least 62% of population of EU. This leads us to the problem of double (in general
multi-) dimensional evaluation of apportionment of seats. It is not obvious that it should
be the population of the countries. For example, Turnovec (1995, 1997), Widgren
(1995) suggest that the second criterion could be GDP: popular public opinion says that
net payers to EU budget should have more “to say” than “consumers” of the budget.
2. Multi-dimensional power index
Let us assume that the same set of decision-makers  N s s s ..., , , 2 1  is differently re-
garded according to k different criterions and decision is made via voting. Such dif-
ferentiation produces the following structures:
• structure 1:  ) ..., , , ; (
1 1
2
1
1 1 N s s s d ,
• structure 2:  ) ..., , , ; (
2 2
2
2
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• ...
• structure k:  ) ..., , , ; ( 2 1
k
N
k k
k s s s d ,
where di is the threshold of a decision.
For the above structures one can define a winning coalition as a coalition, which is
winning in every structure, and subsequently using definition of a winning coalition
one can modify power indices.
Following the idea of Turnovec (1995, 1997) we calculate the double power index
for EU Council of Ministers for two criterions: population and GDP. As can be seen in
table 3, this leads us to different and not obvious results. We may notice that introducing
population changes the power of certain country significantly: bigger power of countries
is corrected up, making the seats distribution more close to proportional one.
Table 3
EU-25 Council of Ministers (before Nice Treaty)
Shapley–Shubik power index Country Votes
(V)
Votes
%
Population
(P)
Population
%
GDP GDP
% V V + P V+GDP V + GDP  + P
Belgium 5 3.79 10.06 2.11 213.4 2.84 4.04 2.20 3.40 2.20
Denmark 3 2.27 5.19 1.09 137.6 1.83 2.39 1.15 2.07 1.15
Germany 10 7.58 80.77 16.95 1903 25.33 8.45 19.27 18.51 19.30
Greece 5 3.79 10.38 2.18 76.7 1.02 4.04 2.26 2.53 2.25
Spain 8 6.06 39.13 8.21 533.9 7.11 6.64 8.53 6.97 8.52
France 10 7.58 57.65 12.10 1289 17.16 8.45 12.85 12.57 12.88
Ireland 3 2.27 3.57 0.75 44.9 0.60 2.39 0.82 1.50 0.82
Italy 10 7.58 57.84 12.14 1135 15.10 8.45 12.89 11.26 12.88
Luxemburg 2 1.52 0.39 0.08 14.2 0.19 1.58 0.17 0.89 0.17
Holland 5 3.79 15.28 3.21 316.4 4.21 4.04 3.24 4.13 3.25
Austria 4 3.03 7.94 1.67 183.5 2.44 3.22 1.72 2.79 1.73
Portugal 5 3.79 9.85 2.07 77.7 1.03 4.04 2.16 2.53 2.15
Finland 3 2.27 5.07 1.06 96.2 1.28 2.39 1.12 1.80 1.12
Sweden 4 3.03 8.71 1.83 216.3 2.88 3.22 1.87 3.00 1.88
United Kingdom 10 7.58 58.04 12.18 1042 13.88 8.45 12.94 10.46 12.93
Malta 2 1.52 0.38 0.08 3.1 0.04 1.58 0.16 0.83 0.16
Cyprus 2 1.52 0.71 0.15 7.5 0.10 1.58 0.23 0.85 0.24
Estonia 2 1.52 1.48 0.32 4.7 0.06 1.58 0.39 0.83 0.39
Slovenia 2 1.52 1.99 0.42 12.6 0.17 1.58 0.47 0.88 0.47
Latvia 3 2.27 2.42 0.54 5.2 0.07 2.39 0.63 1.25 0.62
Lithuania 3 2.27 3.69 0.79 4.9 0.07 2.39 0.85 1.25 0.85
Slovakia 3 2.27 5.38 1.12 10.1 0.14 2.39 1.17 1.28 1.17
Hungary 5 3.79 10.18 2.16 34.2 0.46 4.04 2.24 2.27 2.23
Czech Republic 5 3.79 10.32 2.17 28.2 0.38 4.04 2.25 2.24 2.24
Poland 8 6.06 38.71 8.07 87.3 1.16 6.64 8.41 3.92 8.40
Total: 122 100 445.13 100 7477.6 100 100 100 100 100
Data for new enterers are extracted from official www pages of their Statistical Offices.Single equivalen of double majority voting system 59
Interpreting the results from tab. 4 one can find that declaration about supporting small
countries by great countries by special arrangement of seats is true when we look at the
Shapley–Shubik power index value and it is not true when we add the criterion of 62% of
population being “for” for the decision to be made. This second criterion reverses the pos-
sibility of countries to influence the final voting result: bigger countries are even stronger
in the sense of Shapley–Shubik measure of power than it emanates from their population.
One of the new proposals for the time after 2009 is to use double voting where the
first criterion for a decision to be made is majority of countries and the second crite-
rion for those countries is to represent at least 60% of EU population. This criterion is
equivalent to uniform seats distribution where each country has 1 vote. The results of
Shapley–Shubik power index calculation are presented in table 5 and they confirm
that this way of decision-making is in favour of small countries.
Table 4
EU-25 Council of Ministers (after Nice Treaty)
Shapley–Shubik power index Country
Votes
(V)
Votes
%
Population
(P)
Population
% VV  +  P
Belgium 12 3.74 10.06 2.11 3.64 2.13
Denmark 7 2.18 5.19 1.09 2.09 1.10
Germany 29 9.03 80.77 16.95 9.32 19.56
Greece 12 3.74 10.38 2.18 3.64 2.20
Spain 27 8.41 39.13 8.21 8.61 8.65
France 29 9.03 57.65 12.10 9.32 13.04
Ireland 7 2.18 3.57 0.75 2.09 0.75
Italy 29 9.03 57.84 12.14 9.32 13.09
Luxemburg 4 1.25 0.39 0.08 1.19 0.10
Holland 13 4.05 15.28 3.21 3.96 3.27
Austria 10 3.12 7.94 1.67 3.02 1.67
Portugal 12 3.74 9.85 2.07 3.64 2.09
Finland 7 2.18 5.07 1.06 2.09 1.07
Sweden 10 3.12 8.71 1.83 3.02 1.82
United Kingdom 29 9.03 58.04 12.18 9.32 13.14
Malta 3 0.93 0.38 0.08 0.89 0.09
Cyprus 4 1.25 0.71 0.15 1.19 0.17
Estonia 4 1.25 1.48 0.32 1.19 0.34
Slovenia 4 1.25 1.99 0.42 1.19 0.42
Latvia 4 1.25 2.42 0.54 1.19 0.53
Lithuania 7 2.18 3.69 0.79 2.09 0.79
Slovakia 7 2.18 5.38 1.12 2.09 1.13
Hungary 12 3.74 10.18 2.16 3.64 2.18
Czech Republic 12 3.74 10.32 2.17 3.64 2.19
Poland 27 8.41 38.71 8.07 8.61 8.51
Total: 321 100 445.13 100 99.99 100.3J. W. MERCIK 60
Table 5
EU-25 probable Council of Ministers (after year 2009)
Shapley–Shubik power index Country
Votes
(V)
Votes
%
Population
(P)
Population
% VV  +  P
Belgium 1 4.00 10.06 2.11 4.00 2.46
Denmark 1 4.00 5.19 1.09 4.00 1.71
Germany 1 4.00 80.77 16.95 4.00 16.41
Greece 1 4.00 10.38 2.18 4.00 2.51
Spain 1 4.00 39.13 8.21 4.00 7.76
France 1 4.00 57.65 12.10 4.00 11.09
Ireland 1 4.00 3.57 0.75 4.00 1.46
Italy 1 4.00 57.84 12.14 4.00 11.13
Luxemburg 1 4.00 0.39 0.08 4.00 0.97
Holland 1 4.00 15.28 3.21 4.00 3.31
Austria 1 4.00 7.94 1.67 4.00 2.12
Portugal 1 4.00 9.85 2.07 4.00 2.43
Finland 1 4.00 5.07 1.06 4.00 1.69
Sweden 1 4.00 8.71 1.83 4.00 2.25
United Kingdom 1 4.00 58.04 12.18 4.00 11.17
Malta 1 4.00 0.38 0.08 4.00 0.96
Cyprus 1 4.00 0.71 0.15 4.00 1.02
Estonia 1 4.00 1.48 0.32 4.00 1.15
Slovenia 1 4.00 1.99 0.42 4.00 1.21
Latvia 1 4.00 2.42 0.54 4.00 1.30
Lithuania 1 4.00 3.69 0.79 4.00 1.49
Slovakia 1 4.00 5.38 1.12 4.00 1.73
Hungary 1 4.00 10.18 2.16 4.00 2.50
Czech Republic 1 4.00 10.32 2.17 4.00 2.51
Poland 1 4.00 38.71 8.07 4.00 7.66
Total: 25 100 445.13 100 100 100
3. Power index and distribution of seats
Multi-power index is a right measure of power of certain group relatively to multi-
-criterions. Nevertheless, it is Shapley–Shubik power index or Banzhaf power index
(both are mostly accepted as a measure of power) that obviously do not linearly de-
pend on the number of seats.
Let us look at the following example of two decision structures: (51; 49, 49, 2)
and (51; 33, 33, 34). We shall assume that in both situations decisions are made via
51% majority; the number of subgroups is equal to 3, distributions of seats are differ-
ent, but Shapley–Shubik power index is the same: (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Moreover, it is easySingle equivalen of double majority voting system 61
to show that for the above structures any distribution of seats with the lowest number
of seats not less than 2 and the highest not exceeding 50 gives the same result of
power calculation.
Let us introduce the idea of right power distribution. Quite intuitively we expect
direct proportionality between the number of seats and the power. In this sense, the
structure (51; 33, 33, 34) is more correct than the structure (51; 49, 49, 2). More for-
mally (Bruckner 1996), a structure has (a, b) right seats distribution µ in the sense of
power distribution if:
i
i i i w d ε Ψ µ ε < − < | ) ; ( |
where  ) ; ( w d i Ψ  denotes value of power index in structure  ) ; ( w d .
Values 
i
i ε ε ,  are determined as follows:












− 




 − = 0    ,
100
,
100
1 min max
b a
i i i µ µ ε ,












+ 




 + = 1    ,
100
,
100
1 max min
b a
i i
i µ µ ε .
It is obvious that such a distribution of seats is right only in the above sense and
can be determined only very roughly and fuzzy. We propose the following algorithm
to obtain the right distribution of seats, where the stop rule is the distance from initial
Shapley–Shubik value
3.
The algorithm
Step I. Establish a set of criterions distinguishing every subgroup  ) 1 ( ≥ k .
Step II. Calculate multi power index (if k = 1 then it is a regular power index).
Step III. Calculate the number of seats adequate to power distribution (it is suggested
to use methods of least remainders).
Step IV. Calculate again multi-power index for distribution of seats from step III.
Step V. Calculate the difference between power indices from step II and step IV. If
the sum of absolute differences is not decreasing then stop.
Step VI. If the differences are not acceptable then correct every group’s represen-
tation in such a way that for the greatest difference add 1 seat if the difference is
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positive and extract 1 seat if the difference is negative. Otherwise, do the same with
the group with the greatest opposite difference
4. Go to step V.
4. Example
Let us calculate right distribution of seats for EU-25 after the Treaty of Nice.
In table 6, we present the result of application of the above algorithm. We assume
that every country has the number of seat declared in Nice and decision is made if
more than 50% of votes are for and those countries represent more than 62% of
EU population (as presented in table 4). Using the algorithm we find single
equivalent of double criterion decision-making, i.e., such a distribution of seats
for which the value of Shapley–Shubik power index will be almost the same as
for double voting.
In table 6, column 9, the light grey (originally green) marks the country (here
Germany) for which the number of seats should be increased by 1, the dark grey
(originally red) marks the country (Austria) for which the number of seats should be
decreased by 1. The last position in column 9 represents the distance between
Shapley–Shubik value for double voting and single equivalent for all countries.
As we may see from table 6, step by step, the apportionment of seats being an
equivalent of double voting in European Council is achieved. The last value (7.56) of
the measure of differences (sum of residuals) is lower than the last but one (7.61),
which means that the algorithm should be continued, but the truncation to the mini-
mum number of seats equalled 3 stopped it. The last right distribution shown in col-
umn 25 is therefore the final apportionment.
Table 7 shows distribution of seats after the Treaty of Nice compared with the
distribution of seats being a single equivalent of actual distribution.
As we may see in table 7, the differences between power indices for double voting
and single equivalent are not significant as a whole: the value of t test is 0.010438 for
paired test and is much smaller than any one or two tail critical values. What is more,
this single equivalent distribution really supports small countries: in the new distribu-
tion it is more effective (in a sense of influence on the final result of voting) to have 3
seats than even 7 seats in the previous one. The only inconsequence is inequality be-
tween Poland and Spain: the algorithm was artificially stopped
5.
                                                     
4 To some extent it is an adoption of the method used in classical transportation algorithm.
5 What is surprising is that at one of the pre final Treaty stages such an inequality was proposed by
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Table 7
Distribution of seats after the Treaty of Nice
with double voting and its single equivalent
Country Votes
(V)
S–S
power
index
V + P
Seats
single
equivalent
S–S
single
equivalent
Belgium 12 2.13 7 2.06
Denmark 7 1.1 3 0.87
Germany 29 19.56 56 19.11
G r e e c e 1 22 . 2 72 . 0 6
S p a i n 2 78 . 6 52 88 . 4 2
France 29 13.04 40 12.69
Ireland 7 0.75 3 0.87
Italy 29 13.09 40 12.69
Luxemburg 4 0.1 3 0.87
Holland 13 3.27 11 3.26
Austria 10 1.67 5 1.47
Portugal 12 2.09 7 2.06
Finland 7 1.07 3 0.87
Sweden 10 1.82 6 1.76
United Kingdom 29 13.14 40 12.69
Malta 3 0.09 3 0.87
Cyprus 4 0.17 3 0.87
Estonia 4 0.34 3 0.87
Slovenia 4 0.42 3 0.87
Latvia 4 0.53 3 0.87
Lithuania 7 0.79 3 0.87
Slovakia 7 1.13 3 0.87
Hungary 12 2.18 7 2.06
Czech Republic 12 2.19 7 2.06
Poland 27 8.51 27 0.05
Total: 321 100.3 321 100.01
5. Summary
The results presented can be summarised as follows:
• after the Treaty of Nice the distribution of seats in the EU Council is not propor-
tional,
• improving the voting system by adding criterion about 62% of the population
“for” makes this system more proportional,
• the proposed single equivalent (new distribution) of seats is clearer and fulfils
declaration about being in favour of small countries.J. W. MERCIK 66
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Jednowymiarowy ekwiwalent
podwójnego większościowego systemu głosowania
W artykule rozważano konsekwencje zastosowania zasady podwójnego głosowania w odniesieniu do
decyzji podejmowanych w Radzie Ministrów Unii Europejskiej. Przyjmuje się,  że dana koalicja jest
wygrywającą w systemie głosowania podwójnego, jeżeli jest koalicją wygrywającą w każdym z tych
systemów oddzielnie. Każdy z tych systemów głosowania oddzielnie może mieć inną wartość kworum
oraz inny rozkład wag głosów. W konsekwencji, rola i siła poszczególnych głosujących może być inna
w każdym z systemów głosowania oddzielnie. Przedstawiono także ekwiwalent głosowania podwójnego
w postaci pojedynczego systemu głosowania z inną dystrybucją wag głosów.
Słowa kluczowe: głosowanie większościowe, jednowymiarowy ekwiwalent